

DD/A Registry

83-1904/1

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Personnel Security Policy for SCI AccessFROM:
Director of Security
4E-60 Headquarters

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

5 AUG 1983

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. *E.O./DDA*
7D-24 Hqs.

10 AUG 1983

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
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10-7



Washington, D.C. 20505

9 AUG 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Executive Secretary
National Foreign Intelligence Council

SUBJECT: Personnel Security Policy for SCI Access

REFERENCE: NFIC-9.1/52 of 27 July 1983, same Subject

1. The Agency preference for a 15-year background investigation as a requirement for SCI access is not arbitrary. On the contrary, the position is based on experience and evaluations dating back to the early 1950's. It also reflects the results of the 1980 Security Committee (SECOM) study of personnel security programming in the Community.

2. Our position is based on these specifics:

- ° The 1980 SECOM study found 3 percent of access denials were correlated to negative information that would not have been developed with a 10-year limit on investigative coverage.

- ° This Agency would not accept the premise that clearing security risks represented in the 3 percent figure is an acceptable trade-off for the cost savings which would be realized by adoption of a 10-year standard. Similarly, clearing 1 percent or a fraction of 1 percent of people who would be identified as probable security risks under the 15-year criterion is unacceptable.

- ° More stringent investigations must not be used as a bargaining chip in any debate over the relative merits of 10- or 15-year investigations. To promise more comprehensive investigations is suggestive of an admission of inadequate current investigative scope/standards.

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3. The position of the CIA Office of General Counsel is correct regarding the advantage of separating SCI and collateral classified information. The extraordinary protection afforded SCI must be maintained as a discrete and unique authority and responsibility of the DCI. To establish identical standards (or the appearance of identical standards) for clearance tends to equate SCI access and Top Secret clearance. Court decisions to date have recognized the difference and the authority of the DCI to protect intelligence sources and methods. This could very well change if the judiciary perceives equal investigative coverage is applicable by extension to both SCI and Top Secret determinations.

4. In measuring the impact on resources of a 15-year investigation under DCID 1/14 standards, it must be considered that full 15-year coverage is not called for; actual coverage is notably less than that for Agency staff or staff-like employees. DCID 1/14 represents compromise over the years that weighed limited resources of the Intelligence Community against reasonable minimum investigative standards. To be specific: Neighborhood inquiry is limited to five years; personal interviews of supervisors and co-workers is cut off at 10 years; a 10-year requirement is operative with respect to secondary school education; and checks on credit/financial status go back only seven years. The 15-year requirement is limited to police records, higher education and developed informants who together or separately can provide a composite picture over a full 15 years. It is believed that existing relief from the 15-year standard is sufficient to expedient completion of investigations and the acquisition of necessary information.



Executive Director

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SUBJECT: Personnel Security Policy for SCI Access

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